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Introduction
New Public Management has dominated organisational change in public 
sector organisations for over 20 years. Its thrust was directed towards 
transforming these organisations from bureaucratic to market-oriented and 
efficient entities, primarily focusing on slowing down government growth and 
a shift toward privatisation and quasi-privatisation (Hood, 1991). However, 
in general terms the focus has been on the introduction of ‘private sector’ 
management techniques and an increase in public accountability (Ryan et al., 
2008). 
The impact of these organisational changes has been well documented 
over a variety of public sector organisations and government regulated bodies, 
for example public transport (Wiltshire, 1990); general medical practitioners 
(Broadbent, Jacobs and Laughlin (2001); public hospitals (Llewellyn 
and Northcott, 2005); government audit offices (Pallot, 2003); and social 
housing (Collier, 2005). For the Australian university sector, these changes 
commenced in 1988 with the Federal Government’s Higher Education: A 
policy statement and the establishment of the Unified National System (UNS) 
of higher education. This policy required universities to adopt private sector 
management techniques to improve planning, budgeting and decision making. 
It also required improved public accountability. One of the essential elements 
for public accountability was the development of performance indicators and 
their publication in university annual reports.
The inducement to join the UNS was a promise of large financial benefits, 
continued growth, increased flexibility and greater control over their resources. 
Conversely, these benefits required a commitment to internal management 
reviews, the adoption of private sector management structures, techniques and 
practices, together with a reduction in the size of governing bodies to reflect 
the size and composition of large private corporations. Failure to meet these 
conditions would jeopardize the associated financial benefits (Harrold, 1991).
Using an institutional lens this paper explores the adoption and the 
decline of an accountability measure. Specifically, performance indicators, 
which were accepted as an objective and systematic procedure for the discharge 
of a universities public accountability responsibilities (Linke, 1991). However, 
this study is not about the adoption and decline in the use of performance 
indicators in Australian universities—it is about the adoption and decline in 
the public reporting of such indicators in university annual reports as one 
measure of their accountability.
Institutional Setting
By the mid-1980s participation in higher education started to increase 
dramatically, raising questions about its efficiency and effectiveness. This 
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culminated in the Review of Efficiency and Effectiveness in Higher Education 
(Commonwealth Tertiary Education Commission, 1986), which was highly 
critical of management practices within the sector. The economic downturn 
in Australia during the 1980s highlighted the government’s concern about 
the perceived gap between the sector’s contemporary performance and 
the performance required to help Australia survive and prosper in a more 
competitive international economic environment. In this manner the reforms 
emerged as a result of the government’s assessment of the gap between the 
sectors contemporary performance and that which was required to help 
Australia survive and prosper in a more competitive international economic 
environment (Harrold, 1991). 
From the government’s perspective these issues could be resolved 
by focusing on improving the university’s accountability to its different 
stakeholders and tightening institutional management and accountability 
practices through a deliberate move from collegial governance to governance 
through managerial authority, with this move reinforced, in part, by the 
introduction of new models and management practices. The interesting point 
is that the managerial and accountability reforms that were key elements of 
the UNS were never authorized by legislation. They were merely embodied 
in contractual arrangements between the Minister and the CEO’s of member 
institutions.
Performance Indicators: A Mechanism for Accountability
The evolution of performance indicators in Australian universities can be 
viewed through an examination of (1) the requirement for their development 
contained in the Dawkins White Paper (1988), (2) their development by 
government through the Linke Report (1991), and (3) their performance as 
an accountability measure as detailed in the Hoare Report (1995). Table 1 
presents a tabular summary of the timeline of key events organised by the 
actors involved.
The white paper only contained a partial range of performance 
indicators, supporting instead the development of a funding system that 
responded to institutional performance and accountability (Dawkins, 1988: 
85). The performance indicators outlined by the government are displayed in 
Table 2.
The Performance Indicators Research Group (Linke, 1991) was 
established by the Australian Federal Government in February 1989 to develop 
a broad range of quantitative performance indicators suitable for use at both 
system and institutional levels. The group classified the indicators into three 
broad categories: indicators of institutional context, indicators of institutional 
performance and indicators of participation and social equity. While the project 
was established, in part, to address emerging and persistent calls for improved 
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efficiency and public accountability, the research group issued a note of caution 
relating to the interpretation of performance indicators (Linke, 1991; 128):
The basic function of performance indicators is to assist in 
determining how well a particular institution or department 
has achieved its respective goals. In this respect they form an 
important part — but only a part — of a broader evaluation process, 
in which their proper role as an aid to expert judgement rests on 
establishing a clear understanding of what characteristics are to 
be evaluated and what the indicators can and cannot measure in 
relation to these characteristics. 
The indicators developed are also shown in Table 2. 
Partly in response to this cautionary note, the Australian Federal 
Government announced, on 5 June 1995, a review of the higher education system 
to continue the “development of excellence in management and accountability” 
(Hoare, 1995: 1). Due to the short timeframe allowed to complete the report, 
the committee focused on five key areas, among which were accountability and 
Table 1 
A Timeline of Key Events in the Development of Performance Indicators
Time Actor(s) Event Publication
July 1988 Australian Federal 
Government — J.S. 
Dawkins, Minister 
for Employment, 
Education and 
Training
The issue of a white paper 
detailing specific performance 
indicators for universities and 
the penalties for non-adoption
Higher 
Education: 
A Policy 
Statement
Feb 1989 – 
Jul 1991
Australian Federal 
Government — 
R.D. Linke, Chair, 
Performance 
Indicators Research 
Group
The establishment of a cluster 
of performance indicators 
recommended for adoption by 
Australian universities
Performance 
Indicators 
in Higher 
Education
1988–1996 Australian universities Adoption of performance 
indicators to satisfy the 
requirements of the UNS
June 1995 –
Dec 1995
Australian Federal 
Government — D. 
Hoare, Chair HEMR
Report on the use of 
performance indicators 
and the effectiveness of 
accountability requirements
Higher 
Education 
Management 
Review
2006 Australian universities Review of the reporting of 
performance indicators as an 
accountability measure
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Table 2
Outline of Various Performance Indicators Developed
1988 White Paper 1991 Performance Indicators 
Research Group
1995 Higher Education 
Management Review
Relative staffing 
levels
Institutional Context
Academic and general staff provision
Student demand and background 
characteristics
Financial resource distribution 
Resource usage
Quality of teaching
Quality of curriculum
Course completion 
rates
Student satisfaction
Research 
publications
Institutional Performance
Teaching and Learning 
Quality of teaching
Student progress and achievement
Graduate employment
Research and Professional Service
Research publications, and so on
Professional service
Student dropout rates
Measures of academic 
excellence
Research performance
Quality assurance
Consultancy rates
Indigenous 
participation
Social Equity
Social composition
Educational provision
Source: Dawkins, 
1988: 85–86
Source: Linke. 1991: 19–125 Source: Hoare, 1995: 
63–64
strategic management (which included performance indicators). The report 
acknowledge contemporary accountability as an outcome-based measure 
involved in the critical processes of evaluating performance, and as such, it is 
widely recognized as a major management tool (Hoare, 1995: 35). The report 
saw accountability as a key theme which permeates the discussion on strategic 
management and is driven by, and reported through, performance indicators 
which present specific challenges relating to the measurement of performance, 
because quantitative measures are not always possible or appropriate. While 
the report failed to identify specific performance indicators, it did comment on 
the general indicators it felt appropriate to fulfill an institution’s accountability 
requirement without disturbing the concept of institutional independence. 
These are also incorporated in Table 2. 
Review of the Literature
Emergent theories drawing on a range of ‘institutional’ perspectives have 
attempted to explain the adoption and use of new public management 
reforms within the context of organisational change (Granlund and Lukka, 
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1998; Burns and Scapens, 2000; Burns and Vaivio, 2001). This study uses 
neo-institutionalism approach (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991; Greenwood and 
Hinings, 1996). This approach represents a convergence around multiple 
themes suggested by old and new institutionalism. In this model the concept 
of institutional isomorphism, and its components, coercive, mimetic and 
normative isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) are seen as a primary 
means for the analysis of the institutional environment. This, together with 
institutional legitimacy provides the neo-institutional framework linking the 
dynamics of power and politics. 
New institutionalism also emphasises the legitimacy and embedding of 
such beliefs and norms within organisational fields, as seen in the seminal 
works of Meyer and Rowan (1977) and DiMaggio and Powell (1991) and 
expanded on by Deephouse (1996), Brown (1997) and Deephouse and Carter 
(2005). They argue that belief systems and norms change over time, and 
those institutional concepts provide a valid means of studying emerging and 
changing influences on organisations.
 Recent research focusing on change within specific organisational 
types analyze and explain the adoption (or rejection) of innovative systems 
and practices at a micro level (Collier, 2001; Burns and Baldvinsdottir, 2005; 
Ribeiro and Scapens, 2006). In explaining changes that take place in the formal 
structure of an organization, specifically relating to the societal expectations 
and acceptance of management issues, considerable emphasis has been placed 
on the environment in which the organisation exists (Covaleski and Dirsmith, 
1988a). Much of this literature focuses on how organisations change to become 
isomorphic with their environment (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Institutional 
theorists such as Meyer and Rowan (1977), DiMaggio and Powell (1983), 
Zucker (1987) and Scott (1995) suggest that organisations are influenced 
by coercive, mimetic and normative pressures placed on them which lead 
to institutional isomorphism. These pressures often emanate from sources 
such as the public, government and other regulatory bodies, and have, as a 
fundamental consequence—organisational legitimacy. 
Organisational legitimacy seeks to explain the adoption of new management 
reforms through the perceived legitimacy associated with information provided 
to stakeholders, such as government and the public, as a mechanism for raising 
the profile of the organization or reducing conflict (Ansari and Euske, 1987; 
Covaleski and Dirsmith, 1988a; Mezias, 1990; Burns and Scapens, 2000; Modell, 
2001). This emergent frame of reference recognizes management practices as 
a medium through which social expectations flow and change organisational 
practice, and that such practices may develop as a consequence of coercive and 
mimetic forces arising in institutions outside the organisation. 
Research into management practices in publicly funded institutions and 
government organisations that are required to be self-funded support these 
predictions. Geiger and Ittner’s (1996) study used new institutional theory 
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to explain the adoption of particular practices in government organisations 
funded by allocation, together with government organisations required to be 
self-funding. Their evidence supports the predication that organisations adopt 
new management practices in order to appear efficient and legitimate. In such 
instances, these new practices are predicted to be implemented symbolically 
by organisations to improve their external conferred legitimacy, generally 
conferred by government, the public and professional associations (Deephouse, 
1996; Geiger and Ittner, 1996).
 Therefore organisational legitimacy is the acceptance of an organization 
by its external environment (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Meyer and Scott, 1983; 
DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). This is a crucial concept in institutional theory, 
serving as an “anchor-point of a vastly expanded theoretical apparatus” 
(Suchman, 1995: 571). Therefore, a legitimate organisation is one whose 
values and actions are congruent with the legitimacy-conferring groups. This 
status is conferred by social actors (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Ashforth and 
Gibbs, 1990), who are seen as having the authority to grant such legitimacy, 
the government (Baum and Oliver, 1991; Galaskiewicz, 1985; Meyer and Scott, 
1983) and the public, through public opinion (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Meyer 
and Scott, 1983; Galaskiewicz, 1985; Elsbach, 1994; Deephouse, 1996). 
This study, informed by new institutional theory, examines the adoption 
of performance indicators as a measurement of public accountability and the 
decline of reporting this measure over time. This extends the study of new 
institutional theory to determine if the theory can be used to examine these 
issues, thereby strengthening the linkage between institutional theories and 
practice.
This focus views the environment as comprising symbolic elements that 
are capable of affecting organisational forms independently of the technical 
requirement of the organization. In such cases the adoption and use of 
management practices may be symbolic, mythical or ceremonial, in order to 
enhance the organization’s appearance of rationality and efficiency (DiMaggio 
and Powell, 1983; Tolbert and Zucker, 1983: Covaleski et al., 1996). Therefore, 
a legitimate organization is one whose values and actions are congruent with 
that external party’s values and expectations for action (Deephouse, 1996; 
Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978).
The incorporation of institutionalized practices provides a measure 
of conferred legitimacy on the organisations activities and also protects 
it from having its conduct questioned. Since the survival of government 
organisations depend primarily on the support of external constituents, and 
only secondarily on actual performance (Gupta et al., l994), the adoption and 
use of government-initiated management practices maintain organisational 
legitimacy and ensure continued funding. Building on this body of literature, 
empirical studies of management practices within the public sector indicate 
that publicly funded organisations often implement elaborate management 
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systems to conform to external requirements. However, evidence suggests 
that the adoption of management practices, including performance indicators, 
for the purpose of increasing accountability, is symbolic (Berry et al., 1985; 
Covaleski and Dirsmith, 1991; Lapsley, 1994).
New institutional theory predicts that while the new practices will be 
implemented, they may not actually be used to improve performance or lead 
to greater accountability. This prediction is derived from the general theme of 
the institutional perspective, which is that an organisations survival requires 
it to conform to social norms of acceptable behavior as much as to achieve 
high levels of efficiency (Covaleski et al., 1996). Therefore, we argue that the 
introduction of performance indicators as a measure of accountability only 
serves as a ritualistic/ceremonial means for symbolically demonstrating an 
organisations commitment to rational decision making (Meyer and Rowan, 
1977). We also argue that where this symbolic adoption is accompanied by 
coercive pressure the adoption will fail over time.
Hypothesis Development
The issue of conferred legitimacy provides the prediction from institutional 
theories that when externally initiated practices are used to improve perceived 
organisational legitimacy, the adoption will be symbolic. Meyer and Rowan 
(1977: 341) contribute the theoretical underpinning of this concept. They 
hypothesize that isomorphism with environmental institutions results in some 
crucial consequences for organisations. Therefore, all aspects of the formal 
structure, including the management structure, will “dramatically reflect the 
myths of their institutional environment instead of the demands of their work 
activities”. This gives rise to Hypothesis 1:
H1:  The motivation for conferred legitimacy will produce symbolic 
adoption of government-initiated accountability practices.
In addition to organisational legitimacy, the mechanism of coercive 
isomorphism will influence symbolically adopted practices. Coercive 
isomorphism is an influence that “results from both formal and informal 
pressures exerted on organisations by other organisations upon which they 
are dependent” (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983: 150). 
Further, where practices adopted to secure external legitimacy through 
accountability are only symbolic they may lack permanency. Carruthers (1995, 
313) argument supports this as “ceremonial adherence to legitimate norms 
may have little material impact because formal organisational structure is 
decoupled from actual organisational processes”. This argument of decoupling 
supports Mouritsen’s (1994) claim that public sector agencies are orientated 
by the history dependency of organisational action to reject reform programs 
that politicians may initiate. However, where coercive pressure results in 
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the adoption of symbolic practices, the practice may be short lived (Swidler, 
1979). Indeed, the need to lodge symbolic managerial practices (performance 
indicators) in a formally defined role (accountability reporting) is a constant 
obstacle to the maintenance of that organisational role (Kanter, 1972; 
Rothschild-Whitt, 1979). 
This is the basis for Hypothesis 2: 
H2:  Practices adopted symbolically under coercive pressure will 
collapse over time. 
Research Methods
Design for Hypothesis 1
Sample
For Hypothesis 1 the sample represents the views of senior university 
administrators within Australian universities. The initial population consisted 
of 40 organisations defined by the Federal Government as institutions of higher 
education. Four organisations were removed from the group because, although 
federally funded, they either had not changed their profile from before the 
introduction of the UNS, or they were new single-discipline specifically funded 
institutions. The resulting 36 institutions all carried the status of “university” 
and were incorporated under their own specific state or territory legislation. 
These 36 universities represented 90 percent of federally funded institutions 
of higher education in Australia operating between 1992 and 2007. 
Data
The data source was a structured questionnaire, designed to test particular 
attributes of new institutional theory in a higher educational setting, and 
an archival review of the annual reports for the period 1989 to 1996 of all 
universities included in the sample. This review was carried out to obtain an 
understanding of the antecedent period, the event period and the outcome 
of the introduction of performance indicators. The outcome of this review 
provided verification and an adoption point for performance indicators within 
universities, displayed in Table 3.
Questionnaire Design and Administration
The new institutional theory framework used in the study guided the design 
of the questionnaire. Questions were designed to help explain the factors 
behind the adoption of performance indicators as an accountability measure, 
and identify the degree of perceived legitimacy associated with those practices. 
Two specific questions were used for this, each containing a series of more 
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detailed items. The first question focused on the issue of legitimacy; the second 
was directed at symbolic adoption of the practices. A pilot questionnaire was 
tested at four universities before being administered. In addition, a question 
was asked that determined the perceived level of coercive pressure used by the 
Federal Government in the adoption of performance indicators.
Response Rate
The questionnaire was distributed to staff at three levels of university 
administration: vice-chancellors, senior university administrators, and 
business managers. Together they represent the three major areas where 
performance indicators could be used: academic administration, student 
administration and business administration. Because the focus of this part 
of the study was the adoption of performance indicators as a measure of 
accountability by the university, data collection was kept at the central, rather 
than the faculty level. The questionnaires were distributed by mail to 108 
managers in 36 publicly funded Australian universities.
Table 4 shows that, of the 108 questionnaires distributed, 54 were 
returned, of which 52 were useable. This represented a response rate of 50 
percent, with a useable rate of 48 percent. Responses from the three levels 
of management were evenly distributed at 47 percent from vice-chancellors, 
53 percent from senior university managers and 44 percent from business 
managers. Table 4 also reports the responses of individuals by state, individuals 
by level and university by state.
Variable Measurement
Dependent Variable
A single dependent variable was examined: symbolic adoption. The objective 
of constructing this dependent variable was to determine to what extent the 
individual respondents perceived that the adoption of performance indicators 
as a measure of accountability was a symbolic gesture which conformed to 
social and institutional expectations. The data was obtained through Question 
2 of the questionnaire, which consisted of four items.
Table 3 
Adoption Years for Performance Indicators
Year of Adoption 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 Total
Performance 
Indicators
1 1 2 6 1 7 0 5 23
16
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These items were derived from various studies that considered symbolic 
use (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; 1991; Covaleski, et al., 1993; Covaleski, et 
al., 1996) and were based on the underlying theory espoused by Scott (1995). 
The items focused on four issues. Item 1 considered the argument that specific 
Table 4 
Data Collection Results
Questionnaires 
Distributed
Number of 
Respondents 
(Useable)
Response 
(Useable)
Individual Responses — State
New South Wales 33 19 58%
Australian Capital Territory 6 3 50%
Victoria 24 9 38%
Tasmania 3 2 67%
South Australia 9 3 33%
Western Australia 12 8 67%
Northern Territory 3 3 100%
Queensland 18 5 28%
Total 108 52 48%
Individual Responses — Level
Vice-Chancellors 36 17 47%
Senior University Administrators 36 19 53%
Business Managers 36 16 44%
Total 108 52 48%
University Responses — State
New South Wales 11 8 73%
Australian Capital Territory 2 2 100%
Victoria 8 4 50%
Tasmania 1 1 100%
South Australia 3 1 33%
Western Australia 4 4 100%
Northern Territory 1 1 100%
Queensland 6 2 33%
Total 36 23 64%
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practices are instrumental in the creation of a social reality (Covaleski and 
Dirsmith, 1988b). Item 2 reflected the view that specific practices are symbols 
of a need to conform to social expectations of acceptable practice (Covaleski 
and Dirsmith, 1986; Covaleski et. al., 1993). Item 3 focused on practices as 
symbols, which have their effect by shaping the meanings attributed to such 
activities (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991; Scott, 1995). Item 4 probed the concept 
that practices are a symbolic gesture that reinforces the expectations of 
external parties (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). 
Respondents scored each item on a seven-point Likert scale ranging 
from 1: no influence to 7: highly influential. The responses to each item were 
summed and the mean was then used to give an overall symbolic adoption 
score with a theoretical range of 1 to 7. The higher the score, the greater the 
symbolic adoption of the practice. 
To gain insights into the reliability of the symbolic adoption score, 
factor analysis was used to examine if the measure was uni-dimensional. As 
suggested by Lehmann (1989), a factor loading of 0.5 or less was used as a 
guide for identifying the items least influencing the construct. The analysis 
showed that, overall, all items exhibited influence on symbolic adoption of the 
practices. To confirm the findings from the factor analysis, the Cronbach alpha 
reliability coefficient was calculated. The result was 0.9316.
Independent Variable
The independent variable used to explore the influence that institutional 
pressure had on the symbolic adoption of performance indicators for 
accountability was conferred legitimacy. As with symbolic adoption, the review 
of the literature failed to identify any prior measures that could be used in 
this study. This was due to the nature of the previous research, which was 
mainly limited to single organization case studies. Therefore, it was necessary 
to develop suitable measures for this study. These measures were developed 
from the empirical and theoretical work of major researchers.
Legitimacy
The objective in constructing this variable was to determine to what extent 
the individual respondents perceived that their institution was under pressure 
to conform to the values and actions of interested external parties in order 
to have organisational legitimacy conferred upon it by that external party/
organization. This question consisted of four items, and were designed to 
capture the notion of organisational legitimacy, which is described as a 
condition reflecting cultural alignment, normative support or consonance with 
relevant rules or laws (Scott, 1995). The items focused on three issues: first, 
organisations established by, and operating in accordance with, relevant legal 
or quasi-legal requirements (Item 1) (Scott, 1995). The second issue considered 
the argument that organisations were predisposed to accept structures that 
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presented a higher level of accountability as legitimate (Items 2 and 3) (Scott, 
1995). The third issue is that a legitimate organization is one whose values 
and actions are congruent with the values and expectations for action of 
the legitimacy-conferring organization (Item 4) (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; 
Galaskiewicz, 1985).  
Respondents scored each item on a seven-point Likert scale ranging from 
1: no influence to 7: highly influential. The responses to each item were summed 
and the mean was then calculated to give an overall score for legitimacy, with 
a theoretical range of 1 to 7. The higher the score, the greater the level of 
legitimacy associated with the use of the practice. 
Again, factor analysis was used to evaluate the measure. The analysis 
indicated that the legitimacy score was uni-dimensional for performance 
indicators, with the loading factor exceeding the required 0.5 requirement. 
The Cronbach alpha reliability coefficient was calculated at 0.8328.
Table 5 summarizes the descriptive statistics for all variables based on 
performance indicators.
Table 5 
Summary Statistics for Dependent and Independent Variables
N Mean Std dev Median Min Max
Dependent Variable
Symbolic Adoption
Performance Indicators (SAPI) 52 4.1962 1.1652 4.7000 1.00 5.60
Independent Variables
Performance Indicators
Legitimacy (LEGPI) 52 4.1500 1.2661 4.4000 1.00 6.20
A single question was also asked of the respondents: ‘Do you believe 
that coercive pressure was applied relating to the adoption of performance 
indicators as part of the accountability framework?’. Respondents were 
asked to scored on a six-point Likert scale ranging from 1: no influence to 6: 
highly influential. Because the response constituted the entire population no 
statistical analysis was performed.
19
Watts, McNair and Baard: From Inception to Inertia
Research Design
To test Hypothesis 1, the following cross-sectional regression was estimated:
SAij = a + b1LGij + ej 
Where:
SAij = the symbolic adoption by a university i of performance indicators, 
as constructed from the survey; 
LGij = measure of legitimacy for a university i, for the adoption of 
performance indicators j, as constructed from the survey; and
ej = error term.
Based on the stated predictions, it was expected that the sign of b1 would be 
positive.
Design for Hypothesis 2
Multiple sources, including: different survey sites, documentary evidence 
and interviews (Simons, 1990; Merchant, 1985; Yin, 1984) was used to test 
Hypothesis 2. A review of all Australian university annual reports was carried 
out in 2007. The annual reports were for 2006 and the reporting of performance 
indicators was grouped into nil, minimal, some and comprehensive usage. 
These universities were cross-referenced to the universities involved in the 
earlier study (Watts, 2001). In the 2001 research, 23 universities out of an 
Australian total of 36 universities responded, of which 20 identified themselves. 
Telephone interviews were carried out with senior staff at six universities, and 
followed the interview protocols suggested by Brownell (1995). Three were with 
universities that had discontinued the reporting of performance indicators 
and three with universities that still reported performance indicators in their 
annual reports.
The six respondents were asked a series of open-ended questions focusing 
on the retention or rejection of the reporting of performance indicators in 
annual reports. These interviews were conducted by telephone, which provided 
the opportunity to correct misunderstandings and otherwise redirect the 
respondent towards the intended thrust of questions. 
Results
Hypothesis 1
Table 6 presents the results of the regression analysis of the relationship 
between conferred legitimacy and symbolic adoption of performance indicators.
The regression results are positive and significant with an R2 of .571, 
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an adjusted R2 of .563, an F- statistic of 66.654, and the overall regression 
is significant at 0.000. These results suggest that the desire for externally 
conferred legitimacy serves as a good explanation for the symbolic adoption of 
performance indicators for accountability purposes.
The results confirm Hypothesis 1, which states that the greater the desire 
for conferred legitimacy, the greater the adoption of practices will be symbolic. 
The results add to the empirical weight of management-based institutional 
studies using multiple sites and standard statistical analysis. The results also 
provide evidence that institutional theory can be used to examine a specific 
collection or classification of organisations.
Hypothesis 2
The results for the question on coercive pressures are depicted in Table 7, 
which suggests that the majority of respondents felt that coercive pressure 
was applied through the incentives and threats associated with the Federal 
Government’s requirements to join the UNS. Clustering the responses above 
and below the mid point, it is evident that 78 percent of the respondents 
considered the influence to be significant, while only 22 percent considered the 
influence as less than significant. This finding supports Hypothesis 2.
Table 6 
Symbolic Adoption Regression Analyses for the Accounting Practice
Performance Indicators (SAPI) LEGPI
Constant
Constant 1.309
Beta .756
t. 3.544 8.164
Significance .001 .000 ***
R square .571
Adjusted R square .563
F 66.654
Significance .000 ***
Notes
SAij  =  a + b1LGij + ej
***  =  Significant at 1% level
SAij  =  The symbolic adoption by university i of one of the performance 
indicators), as constructed from the survey; 
LGij  =  Measure of legitimacy for university i, for performance indicators j, as 
constructed from the survey.
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The result of the analysis of university annual reports also supports 
Hypothesis 2: that the practices adopted symbolically under coercive pressure 
will collapse over time. This is displayed in Table 8, which indicates that 47 
percent of Australian universities now do not report, or minimally report, 
performance indicators in their annual reports. 
Interviews with Respondents
Various explanations can be attributed to the drop in reporting performance 
indicators in university annual reports. However, to provide a deeper 
understanding of the phenomena, telephone interviews were carried out with 
senior staff from six universities: three that had reduced, and three that had 
retained the reporting of performance indicators. Of the 26 universities that 
responded to original research (Watts, 2001) 20 identified themselves. This 
allowed a comparison of specific universities from the Watts (2001) research 
with the analysis of annual reporting practices in 2006. Of the 20 identifiable 
universities, eleven (55 percent) are identified as being within the some/high 
category and nine, (45 percent) are identified in the nil/minimal category. This 
is displayed in Table 9.
Interviews provided some insight into the decisions to continue with, 
or disregard, the reporting of performance indicators in annual reports. One 
Table 7 
The Extent to which Coercive Measures were used when Introducing the UNS of 
Higher Education
No
Influence
Total 
Influence
1 2 3 4 5 6
New South Wales 2 3 3 7 1
Australian Capital Territory 1 1 1
Victoria 1 1 3
South Australia 1 2 1
Western Australia 1 3
Queensland 2 2 1
Northern Territory 2 1
Tasmania 1
3 1 5 15 14 3
9 31
22% 78%
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Table 8
Level of University Performance Indicators Reported – 2006
University Annual Reports, 2006 — Level of Compliance
Reviewed Nil Minimal Some High
New South Wales 2006 1 6 4
Victoria 2006 1 2 2 3
Western Australia 2006 4
Queensland 2006 2 2 4
South Australia 2006 2
Australian Capital Territory 2006 1 1
Northern Territory/Tasmania 2006 1 1
4 13 3 17
Total universities 18 20
47% 53%
Table 9 
Identifiable University in Previous Research
Self-identifying Universities
Identified Nil Minimal Some High
New South Wales 6 2 1 3
Victoria 3 1 2
Western Australia 4 4
Queensland 1 1
South Australia 1 1
Australian Capital Territory 2 1 1
Northern Territory/Tasmania 3 1 1 1
Total — self-identifying 20 3 6 1 10
Total — grouped 9 11
45% 55%
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senior academic/administrator from a New South Wales university stated that 
his university had stopped reporting because:
It was seen as a duplication of resources as most of the information 
is provided to the Federal Government in other university reports, 
such as our strategic plan. Also, the administrative burden 
associated with reporting made the practice inefficient. 
A senior administrator at a Victorian university observed:
It is no longer necessary to report these indicators. It was when 
the Labor Government was in power and threatened to reduce 
resources if we did not give then what they wanted. Now it does 
not so seem so important.
Further, a senior academic from a university in the Australian Capital 
Territory stated that their university’s decision to reduce the reporting of 
indicators in the annual report was justified:
Over time my university has progressively reduced the amount of 
information we provided to the opposition (universities) — we are 
in a competitive business. We now structure our annual report 
around our key goals and objectives without needing to justify 
our performance. This, it seems, is acceptable to our stakeholders.
Universities that retained the practice of public reporting did so as a systematic 
process of defining, measuring and reporting on their performance, and as a 
marketing tool. In Queensland a senior academic stated:
… that by demonstrating our performance on a number of 
dimensions we retain the trust given to us by the public and at 
the same time retain our status.
The interviewee from the Australian Capital Territory suggested that:
The old reporting requirements, through the annual report, 
empowered and supported senior staff in carrying out their 
proper functions. It also provided us the opportunity to compare 
ourselves with other similar-sized universities — to benchmark 
ourselves, if you like.
A New South Wales a deputy vice-chancellor stated:
One reason we report our performance indicators is because we 
are good, and we want the public to know it. By showing our high 
student retention rates, high completion rates, low staff student/
staff ratios we attract the best students. Also, our reported 
research output attracts the best academic researchers. We find 
this a win-win situation from a marketing perspective.
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Conclusions
This study examined the adoption of performance indicators as a government 
requirement for improving reported accountability in Australian universities. 
It concluded with a review of university annual reports in 2006, which 
identified a significant decline of the reporting of performance indicators in 
annual reports. The initial analysis considered the responses from 52 senior 
managers in 23 Australian universities in 1999. The second analysis reviewed 
the reporting practices in 2006. This study focused on two research questions: 
(1) to what extent was the adoption of the performance indicators a symbolic 
action on the part of the universities to increase their level of externally 
conferred legitimacy, and (2) why the public reporting of performance 
indicators had declined.
The results support the proposition proposed by institutional theory: 
that the desire for conferred legitimacy will produce symbolic adoption of 
government-initiated management practices. The results also support the 
proposition that practices adopted symbolically under coercive pressure 
will collapse over time. The study also provides insights which advance the 
arguments for using institutional theory by examining the theoretical tradition 
at a national or system level over multiple sites, rather than at the individual 
unit level. This supports the suggestion that institutional theory can be used 
to examine a specific collection or classification of organisations.
Concluding Comments and Issues of Further Research
While the response rates in this study may appear small, 64 percent from 
institutions and 48 percent from individuals, the paper’s major limitation is 
the number of organisations tested. At the time of undertaking the initial 
research, 36 universities represented the total Australian population of 
federally funded universities. However, the research potential of this method 
of investigation seems vast. One way to proceed would be an analysis of larger 
public sector departments, to determine the extent of symbolic adoption and 
continued use of accountability measures resulting from new public sector 
management and reforms.
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